Azure AD (now Microsoft Entra ID) attack techniques target the cloud identity platform that manages authentication and authorization for Microsoft cloud services and hybrid environments. These techniques exploit misconfigurations in Azure AD tenants, application registrations, and the complex trust relationships between on-premises Active Directory and cloud identity.
Azure AD attacks target multiple surfaces. Application consent attacks trick users into granting malicious applications access to their data through OAuth consent flows. Service principal abuse exploits overprivileged application registrations with client secrets or certificates. Tenant enumeration reveals valid email addresses and tenant configurations through publicly accessible endpoints. Token manipulation exploits Primary Refresh Token theft or JWT token forgery when signing keys are compromised. Hybrid identity attacks target Azure AD Connect to move from on-premises AD to cloud or vice versa. Tools like ROADtools, AADInternals, and GraphRunner enumerate and exploit Azure AD configurations. Conditional Access policy bypass techniques exploit gaps in policy coverage.
Azure AD is the identity backbone for millions of organizations using Microsoft 365 and Azure. Compromising Azure AD provides access to email, documents, Teams communications, and Azure resources simultaneously. The hybrid nature of most deployments means Azure AD attacks can bridge from cloud to on-premises or the reverse. Understanding these techniques is critical as organizations increasingly depend on cloud identity.
CDA addresses Azure AD attacks within the IAT domain as a critical identity security topic. Theater missions include Azure AD assessment and attack simulation. Our approach emphasizes that cloud identity platforms require specialized security assessment beyond traditional Active Directory skills.