# Covenant C2 Framework
Covenant is an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework written in .NET Core, designed to give red teams a structured, collaborative environment for managing post-exploitation operations at scale. It was created to address a genuine operational gap: most legacy C2 frameworks were single-operator tools with limited auditability, fragile interfaces, and no native support for team-based campaigns. Covenant solves these problems by centralizing implant management through a web-based dashboard, enforcing task logging for operator accountability, and building its entire implant ecosystem on the .NET runtime, which is natively trusted on modern Windows systems. The result is a framework that red teams can deploy quickly, defenders must understand thoroughly, and threat hunters cannot afford to ignore.
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Covenant is a .NET Core C2 framework that coordinates communication between an operator-controlled server and lightweight implants, called Grunts, running on compromised hosts. It was publicly released by Ryan Cobb and is maintained as an open-source project on GitHub. The framework is built around three core components: the Covenant server, the Grunt implants, and the listener infrastructure that bridges communication between them.
Covenant is not a vulnerability scanner, an exploitation framework, or a network mapping tool. It does not perform initial access on its own. It is strictly a post-exploitation platform: operators bring their own initial access and then deploy Covenant implants to maintain presence, expand access, and execute objectives. This distinguishes it from full-spectrum frameworks like Metasploit, which combines exploitation and post-exploitation in a single toolset.
Covenant also differs from commercial C2 products such as Cobalt Strike in several important ways. Cobalt Strike is a licensed platform with a dedicated development team, a mature malleable profile system, and a long track record in both red team and threat actor campaigns. Covenant is open-source, community-extended, and more transparent in its codebase, making it both easier to modify and easier for defenders to analyze. Covenant should not be confused with other .NET-adjacent frameworks such as PoshC2 (Python-based with PowerShell implants) or Sliver (Go-based), although all three occupy adjacent positions in the red team tooling ecosystem.
Covenant's architecture is explicitly designed for team operations. Multiple operators can connect to a single Covenant instance simultaneously, assign tasks to different Grunts, and review each other's activity in real time. This collaborative model reflects how modern red teams operate during extended engagements and mirrors how sophisticated threat actors organize persistent campaigns.
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Covenant's operational flow begins before any implant touches a target system. The operator first configures the Covenant server, which exposes both the web-based graphical interface and the backend API. The server manages all state: registered Grunts, task queues, credential stores, and communication logs. Once the server is running, the operator configures one or more listeners.
Listener Configuration
Listeners define how Grunts communicate with the Covenant server. Covenant supports HTTP and HTTPS listeners natively, with HTTPS being standard for operational security. Each listener is assigned a bind address, port, and a set of profile parameters that control how HTTP traffic is shaped, including headers, URIs, and response formatting. This profile system allows operators to make Grunt traffic resemble legitimate web browsing or application traffic, a technique that complicates network-based detection.
Covenant also supports bridge listeners, which allow Grunts to relay communications through an intermediate host rather than communicating directly with the Covenant server. This is useful in segmented network environments where compromised hosts may not have direct internet access but can reach an internal pivot point.
Launcher Generation and Implant Delivery
Once a listener is configured, the operator generates a launcher. Covenant offers multiple launcher types to accommodate different delivery scenarios:
Each launcher type is selected based on the target environment's defenses. In an environment with PowerShell Constrained Language Mode enforced, an operator would skip the PowerShell launcher and opt for a binary or MSBuild approach instead.
Grunt Execution and Tasking
Once a launcher executes on a target host, the Grunt initializes, checks in with the listener, and registers itself with the Covenant server. The Grunt then enters a polling loop, periodically requesting tasks from the server. This callback-based model is standard across most C2 frameworks and is designed to avoid persistent inbound connections that would be easier to detect.
The Covenant web interface presents registered Grunts in a centralized dashboard. Operators select a Grunt and assign tasks from a built-in task library. Available tasks include:
All of these tools are compiled C# assemblies. Covenant executes them in memory on the target using the Assembly.Load() method, meaning the payloads do not need to write to disk. This dramatically reduces forensic artifacts and bypasses many signature-based endpoint controls.
A Concrete Scenario
Consider a red team engagement targeting a financial services firm. Initial access is achieved through a spearphishing email that executes a macro-enabled document. The macro runs a PowerShell one-liner that downloads and executes a Covenant PowerShell launcher. The Grunt checks in over HTTPS to the team's Covenant server. From the dashboard, the operator runs Seatbelt to enumerate the host's security posture, identifies that Windows Defender is active but AMSI is not patched, and pivots to an MSBuild-based lateral movement technique instead. The operator then tasks the Grunt with running Rubeus to request Kerberos service tickets (Kerberoasting), which are captured and sent to the Covenant server's credential store. Offline cracking reveals a service account password with domain admin rights. A new Grunt is deployed to a domain controller using that credential, completing the compromise chain entirely within the Covenant interface.
Operational Considerations
Covenant requires careful operational security to avoid detection. Default HTTP profiles, default SSL certificates, and out-of-box staging URIs are all signatured by threat intelligence vendors and endpoint detection tools. Teams running Covenant operationally must customize listener profiles, rotate infrastructure frequently, and avoid using default task names or URIs in live engagements. Failure to do so results in rapid detection by commercial EDR products that maintain indicator databases for common C2 frameworks.
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Covenant matters to security practitioners for two distinct reasons: it is a capable offensive tool that red teams can deploy to test realistic attack scenarios, and it is a documented threat model that defenders must understand to build effective detection programs.
From the offensive side, Covenant enables red teams to simulate the post-exploitation tradecraft of sophisticated threat actors. The framework's task library maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK techniques across multiple tactics: discovery (T1087), credential access (T1558), lateral movement (T1021), and persistence (T1053), among others. This alignment means red team findings can be directly tied to ATT&CK coverage gaps, giving security teams actionable data about where their defenses fail.
From the defensive side, Covenant represents a category of threat that did not exist a decade ago: fully featured, freely available, team-oriented attack infrastructure. Organizations that assume C2 frameworks are only accessible to well-resourced nation-state actors are systematically underestimating their risk. Covenant requires no license, runs on commodity cloud infrastructure, and can be operational within hours of a threat actor deciding to use it. This accessibility has flattened the capability curve between sophisticated adversaries and less experienced ones.
What Goes Wrong Without Understanding Covenant
Security teams that have not studied Covenant's behavioral patterns build detection programs that miss it. Grunt traffic over HTTPS with a customized profile looks like normal web traffic to a firewall. In-memory assembly execution does not produce executable files on disk, defeating file-based scanning. Callback intervals that mimic browser polling (every 30 to 60 seconds) blend into normal endpoint behavior. Without behavioral detections focused on process injection, suspicious parent-child process relationships, and anomalous network polling patterns, Covenant operates invisibly.
Real-World Consequence
Although Covenant itself has not been publicly attributed to specific nation-state intrusions as definitively as Cobalt Strike has, open-source C2 frameworks with identical architectural patterns have appeared in threat actor toolkits. The 2020 CISA Alert AA20-245A documented threat actors using open-source and commercially available tools, including C2 frameworks with .NET implants, to conduct prolonged intrusions against federal civilian agencies. The operational pattern, persistent in-memory implants communicating over encrypted channels with customized profiles, is directly analogous to how Covenant operates. Defenders who understand Covenant understand the detection problem for this entire class of threat.
Common Misconception
A common misconception is that open-source C2 frameworks are "noisier" and therefore easier to detect than commercial tools. This is false. Detection difficulty is determined by operational configuration, not licensing model. A properly configured Covenant instance with a custom listener profile, valid SSL certificate, and domain-fronted traffic is substantially harder to detect than a misconfigured Cobalt Strike installation using default watermarks and stock Malleable C2 profiles.
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CDA examines Covenant within the Threat Intelligence Domain (TID) and the Vulnerability and Security Domain (VSD) of the Planetary Defense Model. The governing methodology is Predictive Defense Intelligence (PDI): see the threat before it sees you.
Within the TID, CDA approaches Covenant not as a single tool but as a representative of a threat category: .NET-native, team-collaborative, in-memory C2 infrastructure. PDI requires analysts to model adversary behavior at the capability level, not the indicator level. An organization that only hunts for Covenant-specific signatures (known staging URIs, default certificate hashes, specific HTTP header patterns) will be consistently behind the threat. When an adversary customizes those indicators, detection fails. CDA's PDI approach instead focuses on the invariant behaviors that Covenant and all similar frameworks share: periodic outbound polling over encrypted channels, parent process anomalies from legitimate Windows binaries (MSBuild.exe, InstallUtil.exe, PowerShell.exe), and in-memory assembly loading patterns that do not correspond to normal application behavior.
Within the VSD, CDA maps Covenant's task library directly to the organization's defensive coverage matrix. Each Covenant task corresponds to one or more ATT&CK techniques. CDA analysts assess whether the organization's EDR, SIEM, and network monitoring stack has behavioral rules that would fire on those techniques regardless of which specific tool is executing them. This technique-centric coverage model is what distinguishes PDI from reactive indicator-based defense.
CDA also examines Covenant as a red team training vehicle. Organizations that have never run a Covenant-based exercise against their own infrastructure do not have ground-truth data about which of their controls are effective. PDI demands empirical validation: deploy the threat in a controlled environment, measure detection and response time, identify coverage gaps, and remediate them before real adversaries exploit the same gaps.
What CDA does differently is treat Covenant not as a specific threat to block but as a detection calibration instrument. If your security stack cannot detect a standard Covenant deployment in a controlled exercise, it cannot detect any framework in the same architectural class during a real intrusion.
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