# NERC CIP Standards
NERC CIP (North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection) standards are a set of mandatory cybersecurity requirements that govern how utilities and grid operators protect the bulk electric system (BES) in North America. Unlike voluntary frameworks, NERC CIP carries the force of law: violations can result in fines of up to $1 million per violation per day, making it one of the most financially consequential cybersecurity regulatory regimes in the United States.
The standards are developed and maintained by NERC (a not-for-profit international regulatory authority), approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the United States, and enforced through the ERO (Electric Reliability Organization) Enterprise, which includes NERC and six regional entities. Canadian provinces operate under parallel regulatory structures that generally align with NERC CIP requirements.
NERC CIP applies to entities that own or operate components that could materially affect the reliable operation of the bulk electric system. This includes generation operators, transmission owners, distribution providers when they meet specific voltage and load thresholds, and balancing authorities. The scope has expanded significantly over successive versions of the standards, now encompassing over 1,600 registered entities across North America.
Covered assets are classified as BES Cyber Systems, a defined term that includes hardware, software, and data that if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused would impact the reliable operation of the bulk electric system. BES Cyber Systems are further categorized by impact level, which drives the specific control requirements that apply.
The regulatory foundation for NERC CIP was laid in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which directed FERC to certify an electric reliability organization to develop and enforce mandatory reliability standards. NERC was certified in 2006. The first version of CIP standards (CIP-002 through CIP-009) became mandatory in 2008, following years of voluntary grid security guidelines that had proven insufficient.
The evolution from voluntary to mandatory reflected hard lessons from threat assessments and reconnaissance activity against U.S. grid infrastructure. Subsequent versions of the standards (NERC CIP v5, effective 2016; v6 and v7 refinements through 2019) dramatically expanded scope and tightened technical requirements. Version 5 introduced the impact-based classification system still in use today and extended coverage to Low impact BES Cyber Systems, which brought thousands of additional assets into scope.
FERC Order 706 (2008) and its successors repeatedly directed NERC to strengthen specific standards where gaps were identified. The 2019 Duke Energy penalty ($10 million, settled) for approximately 127 violations involving configuration change management and access control failures signaled that FERC was not treating penalties as a cost of doing business but as a genuine deterrent. Multiple smaller utilities have faced six- and seven-figure penalties for failures in patch management, access management, and incident reporting.
The standards are living documents. CIP-013, covering supply chain risk management, was added in 2020 as a direct response to the Stuxnet-era recognition that vendor and third-party risk was inadequately addressed in the original framework. FERC directed further enhancements to address virtualization environments and cloud-hosted control systems, and NERC continues to develop guidance on topics including low-impact external routable connectivity and transient cyber asset management.
The bulk electric system is the backbone of modern civilization. Hospitals, water treatment facilities, financial systems, communications networks, and military installations all depend on grid reliability. A successful cyberattack causing sustained outages in a major metropolitan area would have cascading consequences across every sector of society.
This is not a theoretical concern. The 2015 and 2016 cyberattacks on Ukrainian power utilities (attributed to the Sandworm threat group) caused actual blackouts affecting hundreds of thousands of customers. The attackers used spear phishing, credential theft, and custom malware (Industroyer/Crashoverride) to manipulate grid control systems. U.S. grid operators and CISA have documented persistent reconnaissance activity against U.S. electric infrastructure by nation-state actors, with incidents disclosed under mandatory reporting that confirm adversaries have accessed the networks of grid operators.
NERC CIP matters for three distinct reasons. First, compliance is legally required and non-compliance carries severe financial penalties that have materially impacted large utilities. Second, the standards encode hard-won operational knowledge about how grid cyber systems are actually attacked, making them a credible technical baseline rather than a checkbox exercise. Third, the audit process creates accountability structures that most organizations would not self-impose, including third-party review, evidence retention, and systematic gap remediation.
For energy sector organizations specifically, NERC CIP is the dominant compliance driver for cybersecurity investment decisions. Understanding the standards is essential for vendors serving that sector, for cybersecurity practitioners advising energy clients, and for governance professionals managing enterprise risk at utilities.
NERC CIP consists of fourteen numbered standards, each addressing a distinct control domain. The current active versions range from CIP-002 through CIP-014 (with gaps where retired standards existed). Below is a comprehensive summary of each standard's scope and primary requirements.
CIP-002: BES Cyber System Categorization. This foundational standard requires entities to identify and categorize BES Cyber Systems by impact level: High, Medium, or Low. Impact level is determined based on the asset's role and the consequences of its compromise. High impact systems include control centers that monitor or control generation exceeding 3,000 MW, large transmission substations, and systems controlling critical reactive resources. Medium impact covers a broader range of generation and transmission assets. Low impact covers all remaining BES Cyber Systems. The categorization determines which subsequent standards apply and at what stringency.
CIP-003: Security Management Controls. Requires entities to establish and maintain governance structures for cybersecurity: documented policies, senior management approval, delegation of authority, and exception processes. For Low impact BES Cyber Systems, CIP-003 Attachment 1 specifies minimum required controls including physical security, electronic access controls, and cybersecurity awareness. CIP-003 is the governance anchor from which all other standards flow.
CIP-004: Personnel and Training. Requires personnel risk assessment (background checks), security awareness training at least annually, role-based cybersecurity training for those with authorized electronic or physical access, and access management including prompt revocation upon termination or role change. The access management requirements in CIP-004 dovetail with CIP-005 and CIP-006 to create a comprehensive identity lifecycle process.
CIP-005: Electronic Security Perimeters. Requires the definition and protection of Electronic Security Perimeters (ESPs) around BES Cyber Systems. All electronic access to systems within an ESP must traverse an Electronic Access Point (EAP) that enforces access control. Remote access sessions must use multi-factor authentication and encrypted communications. Transient connections must be managed and controlled. CIP-005 is effectively the OT network boundary standard, addressing both the perimeter itself and the communication pathways through it.
CIP-006: Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems. Requires documented physical security plans, defined Physical Security Perimeters (PSPs), visitor control programs with logs, and physical access monitoring. Physical access must be restricted to authorized personnel and logged. Visitor access requires escorts or monitoring. Physical access logs must be retained for at least 90 days. The physical dimension is treated with the same rigor as electronic access because many high-profile ICS compromises have included a physical component.
CIP-007: Systems Security Management. One of the most operationally intensive standards. Requires management of logical network accessible ports (disabling unnecessary ports and services), security patch management (within 35 days of availability for critical patches, or documented compensating measures if patching is not feasible), malicious code prevention (antivirus or application whitelisting), security event monitoring (log collection and retention for at least 90 days, with 15 months retention for High and Medium impact systems), and system access controls (account management, default passwords, and authentication mechanisms). CIP-007 is frequently the source of violations due to the ongoing operational demands of patch management and log review across large asset populations.
CIP-008: Incident Reporting and Response Planning. Requires documented incident response plans, testing of those plans at least every 15 months, and mandatory reporting. Incidents that affect or could affect reliable operation must be reported to the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and CISA within one hour of a confirmed Cyber Security Incident. This one-hour reporting window is one of the tightest in any regulatory framework and has driven significant investment in detection and response tooling at major utilities.
CIP-009: Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems. Requires documented recovery plans for BES Cyber Systems that address response, recovery, and reconstitution. Plans must be tested at least every 15 months, with at least one test per planning period using an operational exercise involving actual recovery of a system (not merely a tabletop). Backup and restoration procedures must be documented and tested. This standard ensures that response planning extends beyond incident containment to full operational recovery.
CIP-010: Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Management. Requires maintaining baseline configurations for BES Cyber Systems, controlling configuration changes (with unauthorized change detection and investigation), managing transient cyber assets (laptops, USB drives, and other portable devices that connect to BES Cyber Systems), and conducting vulnerability assessments at least every 15 months. For High impact systems, assessments must include active vulnerability scanning. CIP-010 directly addresses configuration drift and the transient device vector that has been exploited in multiple ICS incidents.
CIP-011: Information Protection. Requires identification of BES Cyber System Information (BCSI) and implementation of information protection programs governing storage, transit, and disposal. This extends cybersecurity requirements to the information layer, recognizing that network diagrams, configuration files, and access credentials are themselves high-value targets. Media containing BCSI must be protected and, when no longer needed, securely destroyed.
CIP-013: Supply Chain Risk Management. Requires a documented supply chain cybersecurity risk management plan addressing vendor risk assessment, software integrity verification, vendor remote access controls, and notification processes for known vendor security incidents. Entities must also address the risk posed by industrial control system hardware and software vendors, including the risk of malicious code introduced at the supply chain level. CIP-013 was developed in direct response to the recognition that sophisticated adversaries target the supply chain as an initial access vector.
CIP-014: Physical Security. Addresses physical security for transmission stations and substations that, if lost, could result in widespread instability or cascading outages. Requires risk assessments by a qualified third party, implementation of physical security measures based on assessment results, and verification of protective measures. CIP-014 extends the physical security framework beyond CIP-006 to address threats targeting the physical infrastructure itself.
Enforcement and Penalties. NERC's ERO Enterprise conducts compliance audits on a scheduled basis, supplemented by self-reports (entities must self-report violations), spot checks, and investigations triggered by incidents. Violation severity is determined by a risk-based analysis, with penalties reflecting the severity level and the entity's prior compliance history. The Duke Energy $10 million settlement remains the largest, but NERC has issued penalties ranging from tens of thousands to millions of dollars for individual violations. The penalty structure creates genuine financial incentive for compliance.
CDA maps NERC CIP compliance squarely to the Risk Governance and Assurance (RGA) domain under the Perpetual Compliance Assurance (PCA) methodology. The core insight of PCA is that compliance is not an event but a state: a NERC CIP audit is not a finish line but a snapshot of an organization's continuous compliance posture.
For energy sector clients, CDA's engagement approach begins with a comprehensive asset inventory aligned to CIP-002 categorization criteria. Many utilities discover that their actual BES Cyber System inventory diverges significantly from their documented inventory, particularly after infrastructure additions and modifications that were not captured in the formal change management process. Resolving this gap is the prerequisite for all subsequent compliance work.
The Security Posture and Hygiene (SPH) domain, expressed through the Autonomous Posture Command (APC) methodology, is directly applicable to CIP-007 and CIP-010 requirements. Continuous monitoring of patch levels, configuration baselines, and port and service inventories transforms what would otherwise be a periodic compliance exercise into an operational capability. Entities that treat CIP-007 patch management as an ongoing operational process rather than a pre-audit scramble consistently perform better in audits and face fewer operational disruptions.
The Vulnerability and Surface Defense (VSD) domain, through Continuous Surface Reduction (CSR), aligns with CIP-005 electronic perimeter management and CIP-010 vulnerability assessments. Every unnecessary port, every undocumented remote access pathway, and every transient device that connects without verification represents a surface that adversaries have exploited. CDA's approach is to drive these numbers to operational minimums and maintain visibility over every connection point.
CDA maintains a NERC CIP-specific control mapping that translates each CIP standard requirement to specific PCA control objectives. This mapping allows energy sector clients to maintain a single compliance posture that satisfies NERC CIP requirements while aligning with broader frameworks including NIST CSF 2.0 and IEC 62443, avoiding the duplicated effort of managing multiple compliance programs in parallel.